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Pursuant to the Court's order, Appellant submits this brief supplementing Point III of 
Appellant's opening brief 
III. THE DETERMINATION IN DOE v. MARET THAT A NOTICE OF INTENT IS 
CONFIDENTIAL SHOULD BE OVERTURNED. 
If Doe is read as supporting the proposition that an expert witness cannot view any 
documents that were earlier submitted to the prelitigation panel, then Munson respectfully suggests 
that that decision is wrong and ought to be overturned. 
This Court should consider the question of what the Legislature intended when it designated 
the prelitigation process as "confidential" in Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12 (2004). When 
analyzing a statute, courts have been instructed to "read the plain language of the statute as a whole, 
and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." 
Board of Education of Jordan School Dist. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, f9, 94 P.3d 234. 
The lower court's reading of Doe is contrary to the purposes of the Malpractice Act. "The 
Malpractice Act was enacted in 1976 to control the rising cost of medical malpractice insurance." 
Id. (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2). "In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to . 
. . provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims" Utah 
Code Ann. §78-14-2. 
In this case, Plaintiff retained an expert witness in the prelitigation phase of the case for an 
early evaluation. With this information, Plaintiff could then decide whether to pursue, drop or settle 
her claims. She could make a more educated and informed decision based on the expert's opinion. 
This is just what the statute intended: to encourage potential litigants to thoroughly evaluate their 
cases before filing a lawsuit. 
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At the trial court, plaintiff was prevented from using an expert witness because he had 
viewed a report prepared by plaintiffs earlier expert. The expert report was used by plaintiff at the 
prelitigation panel. The court ruled that using the report at the prelitigation panel made it confidential 
and that plaintiff had breached that confidentiality by showing it to a later expert. The lower court's 
decision creates a perverse incentive against a thorough preevaluation of the case. Litigants are 
discouraged against obtaining or using an expert evaluation in the prelitigation phase of the case. 
Without an early expert, and the information that expert would provide, the case would not receive 
the intended early evaluation. Plaintiff will not likely settle with a dearth of information; defendants 
will see no threat and have no incentive to settle. With the disincentive against early evaluation, the 
purpose of the statute would be thwarted. 
In addition, it "is axiomatic that a statute should be given a reasonable and sensible 
construction and that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result." IdL (quoting 
State ex rel. Div. of Consumer Prot. v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988)); accord JL 
Pochvnok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud, 2005 UT 39, ^ 21,116 P.3d 353. In cases where the plain language 
of a statute arguably compels an absurd result, the courts are required to read the statute so as to 
avoid that unreasonable application. Thus, "a court should not follow the literal language of a statute 
if its plain meaning works an absurd result or is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant 
contravention of the express purpose of a statute." Sullivan v. Sullivan, 2004 UT App 485, f 9, 105 
P.3d963. 
As discussed above, the question in this case is whether a retained expert witness is entitled 
to view the "confidential" documents produced in a case. In petitioning for the disqualification of 
Dr. Jacobs, counsel for the Defendants has asked this Court to conclude that § 78-14-12fs 
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confidentiality requirement should be interpreted so as to foreclose such access. This interpretation, 
however, leads to absurd results and should be rejected by this Court. 
The absurdity of this interpretation is most clearly revealed when examining the nature of the 
documents in question. The two confidential documents that Dr. Jacobs viewed were (1) the "Notice 
of Intent to Commence Action" and (2) "a copy of an initial review of the medical records, 
performed by Dr. Greg Kane." Order of Mistrial at f 3. Though the specific Notice of Intent that was 
filed in this case cannot be attached to this motion under Doe, the Utah Code does provide 
illumination as to the contents of such Notices. Under Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-8 (2004), the 
Notice of Intent includes "(1) a general statement of the nature of the claim, (2) the persons involved, 
(3) the date, time and place of the occurrence, (4) the circumstances thereof, (5) specific allegations 
of misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant, (6) the nature of the alleged injuries and 
other damages sustained." Id. (numbering added). In a very real sense, the information that is 
contained in a Notice of Intent tracks the information that is typically contained in a civil complaint. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). Thus, like the Notice of Intent, the Complaint that was filed in the district 
court in this case included: (1) a general statement of the nature of the claim (see Complaint at ff 4, 
7-13); (2) the persons involved (see Complaint at ff 1-3); (3) the date, time, and place of the 
occurrence (see Complaint at fflf 7-13); (4) the circumstances thereof (see Complaint at ffi[7-13); (5) 
specific allegations on the part of the prospective defendant (see Complaint at ^ [14-18); and (6) the 
nature of the alleged injuries and other damages sustained (see Complaint at Iflf 19-23). 
The second confidential document that was viewed by Dr. Jacobs was a review letter that had 
been prepared by Dr. Kane. Dr. Kane was an expert who had been retained by the Plaintiff in this 
case to do an initial review of the potential claim. Significantly, there is nothing in the Utah Code 
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or in the cases that in any way states or implies that a party is prevented from using the same expert 
witness at both the prelitigation proceeding and the trial. Thus, though Dr. Kane's initial review had 
been submitted to the prelitigation panel, there is literally no law or provision that would have 
prevented him from continuing to serve as a witness or consultant for the Plaintiff throughout the 
subsequent proceedings. As such, his opinions and testimony could have ultimately been discussed 
in future depositions, hearings, or even the trial itself. 
Even if the documents in question were rendered confidential by statute, the actual 
information that was contained therein was information that could and would have been accessible 
by any another expert who was subsequently retained to offer further assistance. Under our law, such 
experts are entitled to learn of the general and specific allegations involved in the claim, and such 
experts are also entitled to discuss the case with previously retained experts. 
The motion to disqualify that was filed in this case, then, is predicated upon the belief that 
form should be allowed to trump substance. Even though Dr. Jacobs was entitled to know all of the 
relevant details surrounding this claim, and even though the Plaintiffs were entitled to continue using 
Dr. Kane as an expert, and even though Dr. Jacobs and Dr. Kane were entitled to discuss the case 
between themselves as part of their trial preparation, the motion to disqualify still somehow suggests 
that Dr. Jacobs was "tainted" because he first viewed all of this otherwise admissible information 
in the form of documents that had first been submitted to the prelitigation panel. 
This Court is required to avoid absurd results. By declaring a mistrial in this ceise, the trial 
court held that although Dr. Jacobs was ultimately entitled to have access to all of this information, 
his testimony was still somehow tainted simply because he first viewed it in the wrong form. This 
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result is contrary to the intent of the Legislature, and produces a manifestly absurd result. As such, 
this Court can and should rule that neither a mistrial nor a disqualification was warranted.1 
Following the lower court's interpretation of Doe results in an inoperable statute contrary to 
the blatant and express purpose of the statute. As stated above, the statute was-created to encourage 
early evaluation and settlement of claims. The lower court's reading of Doe discourages early 
evaluation and settlement of claims. This court should, therefore, rule that neither a mistrial nor a 
disqualification was warranted. 
DATED this j Z ^ d a y of March, 2007. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
lIn so arguing, Plaintiff certainly does not suggest that the confidential prelitigation 
documents can be disclosed to the public without penalty. In cases where a Plaintiff either 
intentionally or haphazardly makes such documents available to the general public, some form of 
sanction would clearly be appropriate. In this case, however, the documents were not made available 
to the "public," but were instead only available to a retained expert consultant. 
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